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April 14, 2014 | Mark Paradies

Monday Accident & Lessons Learned: Was the Baker Report a Failure?

For those that have followed BP’s accidents (the explosion at Texas City and the blowout and explosion of the Macondo well to name the most prominent), the Baker Report is a famous independent review of the failure of process safety at BP.

I was reading a discussion about process safety and someone brought up the Baker Report as an excellent source for process safety knowledge. That got me thinking, “Was the Baker Report successful?”

The initial Panel Statement at the start of the report includes this quote:

“In the aftermath of the accident, BP followed the recommendation of the U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and formed this independent panel to conduct a thorough review of the company’s corporate safety culture, safety management systems, and corporate safety oversight at its U.S. refineries. We issue our findings and make specific and extensive recommendations. If implemented and sustained, these recommendations can significantly improve BP’s process safety performance.”

I believe the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo accident provides evidence that BP as a corporation either didn’t learn the lessons of the report or didn’t implement the fixes across the corporation, or that the report was not successful in highlighting areas to be changed and getting management’s attention.

What do you think?

Was the report successful? Did it cause change and help BP have an improved process safety culture?

Or did the report fail to cause change across the company?

And if it failed, why did it fail?

Let me know your ideas by leaving your comments by clicking on the comments link below.

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Root Cause Analysis
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